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International legal positivism and new approaches
to international law
sahib singh∗
A prominent scientist had just given a brilliant lecture on the foundations
of the universe. During the question period an elderly lady suggested that
there was a problem with the professor’s analysis. ‘What is that?’ asked the
professor cautiously. ‘It’s all wrong,’ the woman replied, ‘because the universe
actually rests on the back of a giant turtle.’ The professor, taken aback, forced
a smile and then countered: ‘If that’s the case there is still the question, what
is that turtle standing on?’ The audience tittered, but the woman, undaunted,
replied: ‘Another, much larger turtle.’ ‘But . . . ’ objected the professor. ‘I’m
sorry, Professor, it’s turtles all the way down.’1
1 Introduction
Theory is an unrelenting and inescapable act of manipulation. It is an act
perpetrated by both the form and substance of a theory, by its rhetorical
economy and its substantive claims.My task, here, is to unravel these acts.
But in unmasking the manoeuvres of particular theories, this chapter and
these very words contrive to perpetuate a different form of control, no
less violent than those used by what it seeks to dethrone. Manipulation is
inescapable and this chapter is, therefore, culpable. To understand theory
as a politically violent and power-based aesthetic is to remove it from
* An extended version of this chapter, with an application to Kelsen and Hart, will be
published as: Sahib Singh, ‘The Politics of Theory: Form’ (forthcoming). Observations
concerning the way in which this project has been presented are premised on an intro-
duction written by the editors in October 2011 and comments/observations made in a
workshop held in Amsterdam in November 2011. The former has since been signiﬁcantly
amended, but not viewed by this author.




the realm of innocence and abstraction.2 It is upon this foundation that
this chapter will examine the relationship between neo-international legal
positivism (neo-ILP)3 and new approaches to international law (NAIL).
Speciﬁcally, it will examine the politics that structure this relationship and
the complicity of form in the politics of theory.
Neo-ILP and NAIL cannot solely be understood as a collection of sub-
stantive claims, of turtles, of ideas. They must be understood as projects.4
Theymust be understood as deliberate social constructswhose ideological
postures occur within a speciﬁc historical context, buttressed by material
bases that ground their socio-political dimensions. There is insufﬁcient
space in this chapter to do justice to each of these angles as regards the
stated projects, but they will not be entirely neglected in the analysis
that follows. The power of an idea does not lie in its intrinsic merit. To
receive, process andbecome self-conscious of an idea is insufﬁcient for this
idea to become consequential. It must be deployed according to accepted
forms of knowledge-transmission5 and itmust affect one’s socio-cognitive
practices. The reduction of theory, as a collection of ideas, concepts and
relationships, to the ideational – is corrosive (see also Section 2.3).6 It
elevates the power of a theory’s substantive claims above its form, the
ideational over the material, and the rational over the non-rational.
2 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan Sheridan (tr.), 2nd
edn Vintage 1995) 170; Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in Colin Gordon (ed.), Michel
Foucault Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977 (Pantheon
1980) 78–108 at 81–85.
3 All references to neo-ILP in this chapter only seek to refer to the present project and
the works of Kammerhofer, d’Aspremont and early Beckett. There is undoubtedly other
contemporary positivist work being produced, but these are not subject to the critique
presented here – even if such critique may be applicable.
4 This term is deliberate and intended to take on themeaning provided byDuncan Kennedy:
‘[a] project is a continuous goal-orientated practical activity based on an analysis of some
kind (with a textual or oral tradition), but the goals and the analysis are not necessarily
internally coherent or consistent over time. It is a collective effort, but all the players can
change over time, and people at any given moment can be part of it without subscribing to
or even being interested in anything like all the precepts and practical activities.’ Duncan
Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (ﬁn de sie`cle) (Harvard University Press 1997) 6.
5 Michel Foucault, ‘What is Critique?’ in Sylve`re Lotringer (ed.), The Politics of Truth:
Michel Foucault (Lysa Hochroch (tr.), Semiotexte 1997) 23–82 at 52; Harry Johnson, ‘The
Keynesian Revolution and the Monetarist Counter-Revolution’ 61 American Economic
Review (1971) 1–14 (identifying how both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary ideas
in economics had to obey a certain form).
6 See generally David Harvey, ‘Revolutionary and Counter Revolutionary Theory in Geog-
raphy and the Problem of Ghetto Formation’ in Harald Bauder, Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro
(eds),Critical Geographies: A Collection of Readings (Praxis 2008) 110–125; Robert Gordon,
‘Historicism in Legal Scholarship’ 90 Yale Law Journal (1981) 1017–1056.
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These biases pervade philosophy and normative jurisprudence. Both
ﬁelds are pathologically obsessed with talking around turtles, i.e. sub-
stantive claims.7 Neo-ILP and NAIL are not exceptions. But I have little
interest in turtles. Of greater interest to me is form. To speak of form is to
speak of how theories manipulate, manoeuvre and control. To speak of
form is to speak of the language, grammar and aesthetics8 of a theory –
each of which frames our debates. It is to speak of a hidden, subtle exercise
of power that enables ideas to ﬂourish with the image of innocence. To
expose form is to begin exposing the politics of theory. It is an attempt to
reveal the concealed forces that shape our legal unconscious. This is the
task I undertake in relation to the present project.
But turtles cannot be avoided.9 Nor can the inevitable slippage and
feelings of crises that follow. Of course, NAIL and neo-ILP are sets of
substantive theoretical claims (i.e. turtles). Their respective positionsmay
sometimes conﬂict, sit in uncomfortable agreement or simply look past
each other. In organising the relationship between theories, a theorist
is often deﬁned by an underlying structure of feeling. It is a feeling of
rupture, fracture and instability that arises from the realisation that no
theory can sustain itself solely on its own terms. Epistemic crises emerge
because rival theories make equally justiﬁable claims upon the theorist.
This is both a modern and post-modern condition.10
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (Marion
Faber (tr., ed.), Oxford University Press 1998) 5–15. Normative jurisprudence is obsessed
with talking around turtles in several senses: some theories seek to prove the old lady’s
point (critical legal studies), others reject the latter for being too anti-foundationalist while
claiming that they are not being foundationalist – making claims on the type of turtle
on which law rests, even if it is not the ultimate turtle, while discarding all other types
of turtle as irrelevant (Kelsen’s Grundnorm, Hart’s Rule of Recognition, Rawls’ justice,
Dworkin’s self-image, etc.).
8 This term is meant speciﬁcally as deﬁned and circumscribed by Pierre Schlag: ‘the aes-
thetic pertains to the forms, images, tropes, perceptions, and sensibilities that help shape
the creation, apprehension, and even identity of human endeavors . . . [it is] those recur-
rent forms that shape the creation, apprehension, and identity of law . . . [it is] something
that a legal professional both undergoes and enacts, most often automatically, with-
out thinking . . . [and] aesthetics help shape the cognitive, emotive, ethical, and political
preoccupations, goals, values, and anxieties of legal professionals.’ Pierre Schlag, ‘The
Aesthetics of American Law’ 115 Harvard Law Review (2002) 1047–1118 at 1050–1053.
9 Form always collapses into substance and vice versa: Sahib Singh, ‘Narrative and Theory:
Formalism’s Eternal Return’ 84 BYBIL (forthcoming, 2013) at Section 1.
10 Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy
of Science’ 60 The Monist (1977) 453–472 at 453–455; David Harvey, The Condition of
Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Basil Blackwell 1990) 9, 39;
Richard Bernstein, ‘Incommensurability and Otherness Revisited’ in Richard Bernstein
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To do theory is then to realise two things. First, that any sense of
identity (of the self and of law) is displaced by rationality itself: one is
always shifting to a position of disagreementwith the position that one has
already settled on. Second, that because there is no position outside theory
where onemay adjudge a theory, progress or change in theoretical thought
is not so much the result of the progressive evolution of ideas, but rather
the product of particular socio-political conditions or the structure from
which they emerge.11 These structuring feelings impact on how we can
address the substantive positions that are integral to neo-ILP and NAIL.
As lawyers, we should be concerned with delineating the boundaries and
particularities of law. But theoretical positions precede our capability to
engage with and cognise it, for they deﬁne what we perceive it to be.
And yet any rational being will realise that no theory can sustain itself,
given both internal (a ‘hidden awareness of the impossibility of its own
project’)12 and external conditions (socio-political considerations). The
issue that then emerges is our ability to delineate the boundaries of our
discipline with any security. But what shields us from these concerns,
and the existential angst that inevitably follows, is the form of theory. It
insulates a theory from thatwhich can destabilise it (and the theorist). The
analysis that follows looks at the formof the relationship between neo-ILP
and NAIL. This foundational examination is elsewhere complemented
with a detailed look at the form of Kelsenian and Hartian approaches –
the main strands within neo-ILP.13
2 The politics of theory: comments on the form of a relationship
The present project, neo-ILP, is premised on a discursive engagement
between theories. It asks where neo-ILP stands as a scholarly approach,
where its future potential lies and what it has learned from the NAIL
The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity (MIT
Press 1992) 57–78 at 57–58.
11 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (Keith Tribe (tr.),
Columbia University Press 2004) 107–112.
12 David Kennedy, ‘A Rotation in Legal Scholarship’ in Christian Joerges, David M. Trubek
(eds), Critical Legal Thought: An American–German Debate (Nomos 1989) 353–396 at
359.
13 Sahib Singh, ‘The Politics of Theory: Form’ (forthcoming); Sahib Singh, ‘International
Law as a Technical Discipline: Critical Perspectives on theNarrative Structure of a Theory’
in Jean d’Aspremont (ed.), Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of
the Ascertainment of Legal Rules (2nd edn Oxford University Press 2013) 236–261; Singh,
n. 9.
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charge.14 Certainly, engagement is a signiﬁcant and welcome advance on
the ‘detached, disengaged affair’15 or lack of ‘meaningful debate’16 that
typiﬁed the relationship betweennewandmainstream legal scholarship in
the 1990s and 2000s. But it also comes with its own politics: the subtleties
of how the debate is framed, the positions ascribed to various theories
(and how these positions are evaluated), as well as the manner in which
confrontation is avoided and at other times embraced. It is the narrative
structure,17 or rhetorical economy, and aesthetics of a project that expose
these politics.18 An analysis of form reveals the strategies of persuasion,
manipulation and control that often go unnoticed and delicately structure
an enquiry. I hope to make these explicit as regards the present project by
looking at three different choices that structure the way in which dialogue
between neo-ILP and NAIL is cast by the former.
2.1 The politics of choice→ the politics of deﬁnition
Theory is rife with political struggle. On an ideational level, this struggle
is enacted on the very paraphernalia of which theories are comprised.
Concepts, categories, labels and constructed relationships are all primed
14 Jo¨rg Kammerhofer, Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Introduction: Mapping 21st Century Inter-
national Legal Positivism’ (unpublished paper, 2010) at 2 [Editors’ note: the author
refers to the ﬁrst version of the introductory chapter; in order to preserve the refer-
ences, that version has been made available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2372778]; Jo¨rg
Kammerhofer, ‘International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World: A Proposal for
Greater Focus in Scholarship’ 3 AjV Newsletter (2013) 2–4 at 2–3.
15 Deborah Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship in International
Law’ 65 Nordic Journal of International Law (1996) 341–383 at 342.
16 Thomas Skouteris, Outi Korhonen, ‘Under Rhodes’ Eyes: The “Old” and “New” Interna-
tional Law at LookingDistance’ 11 LJIL (1998) 429–440 at 430; see also Thomas Skouteris,
‘Bridging the Gap? The 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law’ 12 LJIL (1999) 505–509.
17 For an introduction to critical narrative analysis asmethod in international law, see Singh,
‘Discipline’, n. 13; Singh, n. 9.
18 A brief comment on method: the relationship between narrative/rhetoric and aesthetics
is an uneasy one. On the one hand, aesthetics may be but a subset of the rhetorical
economy of a text; on the other hand, it structures that very rhetorical economy. Both
are treated as interlinked but fundamentally distinct methods of analysis in the context of
this chapter. But as methods, they can only perform a critical endeavour. An aesthetic or
narrative understanding of theory and law precludes a claim to correctness: it only opens
up an ontologically different position from that under examination and it cannot preclude
that another narrative interpretation is any less ‘correct’. Furthermore, this chapter is an
aesthetic and narrative construct that cannot claim any further claim to being right – it
does not seek to do so. By being reﬂexive, it can, however, be transparent in its motives.
Both methods are forms of ideology critique.
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for symbolic conﬂict. They do not have ﬁxed meanings and contours, but
cannot do without historical ones; they rather provide the surface upon
which social and ideational conﬂict is waged and made visible.19
So, how the editors of this project frame the debate between neo-ILP
andNAIL becomes increasingly important.What visions of these projects
are foregrounded, which are marginalised and why? What is meant by the
‘post-modern world’ in which neo-ILP strives to exist? Is Critical Legal
Studies (CLS) equated with the ‘post-modern critique’ in law? Why is
there a felt need to reconstruct the theoretical foundations of neo-ILP
in light of such critiques? What are the consequences of considering the
works of Kennedy and Koskenniemi to be ones of deconstruction? Why
are Kennedy and Koskenniemi engaged with and not Allott, Chimni,
Anghie, Mie´ville or Marks?20
I contend that these rhetorical and symbolic manoeuvres, under the
guise of description, legitimate, consciously or unconsciously, the pre-
vailing legal ideology. The constructed narrative is one of neo-ILP as the
underdog, the contemporary outsider so relegated in the battle of the-
ories for discursive dominance. It is insulated from a range of critiques
and elevated as a necessary and modern method. NAIL, on the other
hand, suffers from reductionism, misapprehension and the consequences
of negative connotations.
The ﬁrst question-begging manoeuvre is the positioning of CLS (here,
NAIL) alongside deconstruction.21 Koskenniemi’s and Kennedy’s early
works are often cast as onesof deconstruction, inmyopinion incorrectly.22
But neither International Legal Structures (Structures), nor From Apology
to Utopia (FATU) are works of deconstruction, but rather, as stated by the
19 Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (Verso 1996) 36–46, 84–104.
20 Kammerhofer and d’Aspremont, n. 14 at 4, 6–7; Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism and the
Sources of International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment of Legal Rules (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2011) 90–95, 110–117.
21 Kammerhofer and d’Aspremont, n. 14 at 7. While the editors use CLS to indicate critical
thought in international law, I will use this to refer to the American school of thought that
ﬂourished between the 1960s and 1990s. Instead, NAIL will refer to the strain of critical
thought in international law that came into ascendance in the 1980s and continues today.
There are considerable and important differences between the two schools.
22 E.g. Iain Scobbie, ‘Towards the Elimination of International Law: SomeRadical Scepticism
about Sceptical Radicalism’ 61 BYBIL (1990) 339–362 at 339. Critical theorists also make
this mistake: Anthony Carty, ‘Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory
of International Law’ 2 EJIL (1991) 66–96 at 69–70. Others get it right: Emmanuelle
Jouannet, ‘Koskenniemi: A Critical Introduction’ in Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of
International Law (Hart 2011) 1–32.
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authors themselves,23 of structuralism. The differentiation is vital. It may
be, as I contend, that these are works settled in modernity and are not
‘post-modern critiques’.24 If accepted, this has obvious consequences for
the present project. Let me begin by ﬁrst demonstrating my argument.
There are vital differences between structuralism and deconstruction.25
Deconstruction undoes structuralism, while simultaneously making
structuration unavoidable. Structuralism depends on a centre, ‘that is,
a set of constitutive norms and procedures through the totality of which
the ideal model of a given activity is practically established, changed and
enacted’.26 This centre deﬁnes, imports and escapes, simultaneously, a
totality (whether it be international law or some other structure). Decon-
struction is the historical rupture that questioned the existence of the
centre. It redeﬁned how we think about the structurality of structure:
Thus it has always been thought that the center, which is by deﬁnition
unique, constituted that very thing within a structure, which while gov-
erning the structure, escapes structurality. This is why classical thought
concerning structure could say that the center is, paradoxically, within the
structure and outside it. The center is the center of the totality, and yet,
since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality),
the totality has its center elsewhere. The center is not the center.27
For the deconstructionist, the centre does not exist, but becomes ‘a func-
tion, a sort of nonlocus in which an inﬁnite number of sign-substitutions
came into play . . . everything [becomes] discourse’.28 Deconstruction
would have potentially devastating consequences if applied to interna-
tional law.29 But in Koskenniemi’s 1989 FATU, we ﬁnd far more Saussure,
23 David Kennedy, ‘Critical Theory, Structuralism and Contemporary Legal Scholarship’
21 New England Law Review (1986) 209–289 at 266 (fn. 137); Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Letter
to the Editors of the Symposium’ 93AJIL (1999) 351–361 at 355. Koskenniemi refers to his
1989 work as having deconstructionist elements: see Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology
to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing
Co. 1989, reissued Cambridge University Press 2005) 6–14, 536–537, 541. This perhaps
elevates the potential for misapprehension, but see below.
24 Kammerhofer and d’Aspremont, n. 14 at 4.
25 See Derrida’s famous deconstruction of structuralism: Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign
and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences’ in Jacques Derrida, Writing and Differ-
ence (Alan Bass (tr.), University of Chicago Press 1978) 278–293.
26 Akbar Rasulov, ‘International Law and the Poststructuralist Challenge’ 19 LJIL (2006)
799–827 at 801.
27 Derrida, n. 25 at 279 (emphasis in original). 28 Derrida, n. 25 at 280.
29 For an overview, see Rasulov, n. 26 at 810–816.
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Le´vi-Strauss and the Frankfurt School’s Critical Theory than we do Der-
rida. But there is plenty of room for ambivalence in his deployment of
structuralism and Critical Theory.30
Koskenniemi, at points, refers to the method employed in FATU as
deconstructionist.31 But he is also perfectly aware that ‘many’ deconstruc-
tionists would not call, or accept, it as such.32 The entire premise of FATU
is to explicate the ‘grammar’, ‘deep structure’ or ‘langue’ of international
law. It attempts to describe the structural conditions that circumscribe
what can be said in international legal argument. Apology and utopia,
normativity and concreteness are opposites that function as centres and
structure the conditions of possibility within and between which interna-
tional legal argument operates.33 A structuralist sustains the argumen-
tative structure of law (however wide this may be), a deconstructionist
throws them wide open, demonstrating the inevitable and continuous
discursive slippage that follows from unavoidably proceeding outside of
the structure.34 Koskenniemi remains avowedly structuralist despite his
30 I relegate my reading of Kennedy’s Structures to a footnote because I consider it to be
a clear-cut example of structuralist work. In contrast, Koskenniemi’s FATU is somewhat
more difﬁcult to qualify; despite its methodological transparency. Kennedy looks at how
international law is structured by a deep incoherence, between respecting sovereigns and
governing them. It was an internal examination of international law that demonstrated the
circular and recurring rhetorical structure. But the deep incoherence was precisely what
structured the discipline. It is structuralist precisely because it sustained speciﬁc schema
as stable and as constitutive of international law as a structure. See David Kennedy,
International Legal Structures (Nomos 1987).
31 See references in n. 23. 32 Koskenniemi, FATU, n. 23 at 10 and fn. 8.
33 Koskenniemi, FATU, n. 23 at 11.
34 For a great demonstration of this, see Pierre Schlag, ‘Cannibal Moves: An Essay on
the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction’ 40 Stanford Law Review (1988) 929–972.
Another way of viewing Koskenniemi’s work is as artiﬁcially and prematurely arrested
deconstruction. It has been terminated at precisely the point at which it could reconﬁgure
and undermine international law as law. It has been terminated by Koskenniemi precisely
so that he can sustain the functioning and identity of the international lawyer as social
agent (Koskenniemi, FATU, n. 23 at 546–561). Chapter 8 of FATU tempers everything
that came before it. Deconstruction is terminated in order to sustain a certain politics
or normative agenda. The issue is not so much that one could want deconstruction
to carry on forever, but that it has been terminated too soon. It has been terminated
before it can shake the centres that determine the structure of international law. This
position (the premature termination of deconstruction) is explained and critiqued in
Pierre Schlag, ‘“Le Hors de Texte, C’est Moi”: The Politics of Form and the Domestication
of Deconstruction’ 11 Cardozo Law Review (1989–1990) 1631–1674; Pierre Schlag, ‘The
Problem of the Subject’ 69 Texas Law Review (1991) 1627–1743; Pierre Schlag, ‘A Brief
Survey of Deconstruction’ 27 Cardozo Law Review (2005) 741–752; Peter Dews, Logics of
Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory (Verso 1987)
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contextualisation andhistorically contingent examinationof the structure
of international law. Koskenniemi’s ﬁeld of analysis is the international
legal profession, not merely texts and doctrines – it proceeds, at its edges,
to be an examination of a culture. Much as Le´vi-Strauss did with myths,35
Koskenniemi sought to take apart the assumptions and rules that gov-
erned the production of international legal arguments. This exposition
made explicit the repeating patterns that transcend and order the content
of individual arguments, exposing them to be part of a system of shifting
internal references generated and sustained by various acts of abstrac-
tion. But Koskenniemi’s structuralism was also complemented by Critical
Theory. The former is not a theoretical straitjacket (given the contrasting
approach to history taken in each of these).
Koskenniemi’s structuralism sought to shake the normalcy and routine
of objectiﬁed legal positions. In this endeavour he found an ally in the
Frankfurt School and the works of Adorno, Habermas, Horkheimer and
Marcuse.36 But Critical Theory not only buttressed his critical endeavour.
It also enabled Koskenniemi to sustain his politically idealistic belief in
the agency of the international lawyer.37 Koskenniemi sought to undo
all ‘objectifying knowledge [which] has seemed to work as an ideology,
or a “false consciousness”’.38 In this context, ideology is a form of con-
sciousness that acts to change and limit the actions and ideas of the
international lawyer, while simultaneously imposing itself on the world
through the actions of said lawyer. In short, Critical Theory seeks to undo
false consciousness. It does so by positing a theory that both exists in the
33–44, 200–219. For a similar reading of Koskenniemi to mine, see Outi Korhonen, ‘New
International Law: Silence, Defence or Deliverance?’ 7 EJIL (1996) 1–28 at 19–21. A
further point of note is that Koskenniemi relies a great deal on the work of Roberto Unger,
perhaps one of the few forefathers of CLS to never come close to deconstructive analysis.
35 Inparticular,ClaudeLe´vi-Strauss,StructuralAnthropology,Vol. 1 (Claire Jacobson,Brooke
Grundfest Schoepf (tr.), Penguin 1968); Claude Le´vi-Strauss,The SavageMind (University
of Chicago Press 1966) (developing the concept of bricolage at 16–33).
36 Koskenniemi, FATU, n. 23 at 537–543. This reading of Koskenniemi ﬁnds certain agree-
ment in Korhonen’s cave metaphor – as a third reading of Koskenniemi, see Korhonen,
n. 34 at 23–26.
37 Emancipation from objectifying knowledges must be through society (of international
lawyers), through the actualising of theory in life. Critical Theory is heavily dependent
on a mechanism for agency, just as Koskenniemi’s reconstructive project and ethics of
responsibility is. See, on Critical Theory, Max Horkheimer, ‘Traditional and Critical
Theory’ in Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays (Matthew J. O’Connell et al.
(trs), Seabury Press 1972) 188–243 at 212–213. For Koskenniemi on critical normative
practice and the international lawyer, see Koskenniemi, FATU, n. 23 at 545–563.
38 Koskenniemi, FATU, n. 23 at 538.
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world and acts in the world to bring about changes in social behaviour.
A critical theory avoids substituting its own false consciousness because
its own claim to the social world is subject to its own critique: it is self-
reﬂective.39 By turning to the Frankfurt School, Koskenniemi was able
to reﬁne his critique of objectivity by developing his notion of critique,
historically situate his structuralist analysis and open up the conceptual
space to sustain his politico-moral stance on the reconstructed role of
international lawyers and their agency. It was – in short – a deft, and
necessary, methodological turn.40
If one accepts these arguments and their logic, FATU is not a work of
deconstruction. The tragedy lies in the reading. Rhetorically, as amatter of
form, neo-ILPﬁrstmisapprehends nascentNAIL –notwithout the help of
the latter. It then etches this misapprehension within Koskenniemi’s text.
And these moves are not without consequences. First, it invites the judg-
ment and accusations of legal nihilism that inevitably accompany the label
‘deconstruction’. James Crawford was almost certainly not alone when he
commented that Koskenniemi had shown ‘with overwhelming erudition
the impossibility of our discipline’.41 This is a common mainstream posi-
tion. It reproaches early-NAIL for seeking to eliminate international law.
And it is normally accompanied with other crude reductions (for exam-
ple, reading ‘international law is irreducibly political’ as ‘international law
is politics’).42 The problem is that the narratives of liberalism and that of
its critique have both inherited twin dichotomous reductions. Liberalism
resorts to the reductionist allegation of nihilism in the face of a threat
39 Koskenniemi, FATU, n. 23 at 540–543 (Koskenniemi avoids instituting his own false
consciousness).
40 The intellectual marriage of the two traditions (structuralism and Critical Theory) is
highly problematic – but we do not see the inconsistencies emerge in Koskenniemi’s anti-
formalistic methodology. See, generally, Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’ in James D.
Faubion (ed.), The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, Vol. 3: Power (Robert Hurley
et al. (trs), Penguin 2002) 111–133 at 115–116.
41 James Crawford, [Introductory Remarks to Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Wonderful Artiﬁ-
ciality of States’] 88 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1994) 22 at
22; see also Rasulov, n. 26 at 807; Jason Beckett, ‘Countering Uncertainty and Ending
Up/Down Arguments: Prolegomena to a Response to NAIL’ 16 EJIL (2005) 213–238 at
213; Nigel Purvis, ‘Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law’ 32 Harvard Inter-
national Law Journal (1991) 81–127 at 121; Scobbie, n. 22.
42 For a rebuttal, see Martti Koskenniemi, ‘What Should International Lawyers Learn from
Karl Marx?’ in Susan Marks (ed.), International Law on the Left: Re-Examining Marxist
Legacies (Cambridge University Press 2008) 30–52 at 43. Early NAIL circumvents nihilism
through situationality and perspectivism; see Koskenniemi, FATU, n. 23; Korhonen, n. 34;
Cass, n. 15.
11 international legal positivism and new approaches 301
to its form, and critical theories make similar reductionist allegations
of objectivism. By giving Koskenniemi’s and Kennedy’s work the label
of deconstruction, we are thrown into these beside-the-point rhetorical
manoeuvres that are embedded within the ideologies of various posi-
tions. It is an inherited reality of the language: its myth. But this is not
the real problem. Not only does neo-ILP inscribe a misapprehension into
the theory of early-NAIL, but it exports this misapprehension. Its pur-
ported engagement with NAIL is premised on a falsity – on the exported
misapprehension.43 This not only nulliﬁes the constructive potential of
any such engagement, but more importantly, it stunts any transforma-
tive capacity that early-NAIL work may carry. The politics of choice are
masked by the neutrality of deﬁnition. But deﬁnition is never neutral. It
is the empty form on, and through, which social struggle is conducted.
But it is an unjustiﬁed violence when it is wrong. Ideas are inhibited, sub-
sumed and co-opted by precisely this manoeuvre. History has, however,
taught us that none of these neutralising effects is new to dissident or
revolutionary theories.44
2.2 Insulating a theory: the politics of incommensurability
Theorists make consistent and considered efforts to safeguard their ideas
from competing theories. Theories must, after all, defend the conceptual
space in which they wish to function. Part of doing so requires shielding
the reader: she ought not to be torn in several different directions, between
competing ideas and considerations. For epistemological rupture cannot
aid in the socio-cognitive assimilation of an idea.45 Different theories
use different strategies – dependent on their intellectual heritage and
determining aesthetics. Essentialist and incorrect delineations (with their
43 It undermines the foundational questions on which the present project is based; see
Kammerhofer and d’Aspremont, n. 14 at 4. Holistically, the project seems premised on
a fallible house of cards: (a) CLS is founded upon the work of Kennedy’s Structures and
Koskenniemi’s FATU and no other references are given to the school’s diverse work; (b)
these CLS works are deconstructionist and post-modern critiques; (c) neo-ILP is possible
in this post-modern world if it can sustain its theoretical foundations given (a) and (b).
Obviously, if either (a) or (b) are undermined, then the project – at least on its own
terms – collapses, or at the very least, fails to deliver on its promises.
44 See Section 2.3 below for further comments on the relationship between counter-
revolutionary and revolutionary theories.
45 On epistemological rupture, see text accompanying n. 10. Also see Singh, ‘Discipline’,
n. 13 at 236.
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inherited biases) regularly come to the fore. But perhaps most prominent
in neo-ILP is the theory’s approach to incommensurability.
A Kuhnian incommensurability thesis begins from the proposition
that certain theories exist and ‘practice their trades in different worlds’.46
Incommensurable theories cannotmake ‘complete contactwith the other’s
viewpoints’,47 and may disagree on the deﬁnition of the problem, meth-
ods used to solve it and the standards imported into such methods. The
thesis is one that posits an understanding of how theories can be com-
pared and evaluated. Because there is no completely common language,
translation between competing incommensurable theories is the site for
political conﬂict.48 The posited degree of incommensurability (or com-
mensurability) between theories, as well as the nature of the translation
that takes place between them, determines the extent, productivity and
political economy of any discursive engagement between them.
Here, I argue that the incommensurability thesis – in various guises
and forms – permeates the form and texture of the neo-ILP project. NAIL
and neo-ILP have ‘completely different points of origin’, they disagree on
the ‘framework of academic enquiry’, function with different linguistic
theories, ‘diverge [in regards the] constructive side in positivist epistemol-
ogy’ and take opposing views regarding the Enlightenment project.49 The
narrative established here, and elsewhere,50 is that these theories occupy
different ideational and conceptual worlds. They are, for the large part
incommensurable, as regards the traditions they belong to, the intellectual
46 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions (2nd edn University of Chicago
Press 1970) 150; See also Thomas S. Kuhn, ‘Theory Change as Structure Change: Com-
ments on Sneed Formalism’ in Robert E. Butts, Jaakko Hintikka (eds), Historical and
Philosophical Dimensions of Logic: Methodology and the Philosophy of Science (Reidel
1977) 289–309; Paul Feyerabend, ‘Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism’ in Herbert
Feigl, Grover Maxwell (eds), Scientiﬁc Explanation, Space, and Time (University of Min-
nesota Press 1962) 28–97; Bernstein, n. 10.
47 Kuhn, Structure, n. 46 at 148 (emphasis added); see also Kuhn, ‘Theory Change’, n. 46 at
300–301.
48 Incommensurable theories can still be compared because of the openness of our linguistic
horizons. Translation occurs where there is no common language between incommen-
surable theories. Language enables communication. A given tradition is not linguistically
rooted in its own world and rules. The ‘myth of the framework’ was rejected by Karl Pop-
per, ‘Normal Science and Its Dangers’ in Imre Lakatos, Alan Musgrave (eds), Criticism
and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press 1970) 51–59 at 56.
49 Kammerhofer and d’Aspremont, n. 14 at 6–7.
50 See also d’Aspremont, n. 20 at 105–116; Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Reductionist Legal Positivism
in International Law’ 106 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (2012)
368–370 at 369.
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frameworks they advance and the methods they use. But this must not
be viewed as a self-evident categorisation, but a constructed one. Incom-
mensurability is a methodological manoeuvre engineered to ensure a
limited, but vital, immunity from the effects of critical positions. It may
be manipulated to be both a shield and a sword, to insulate a theory from
adversaries and to attack them.51
2.2.1 Insulation technique 1: false essentialism
If we accept, for the moment, that NAIL and neo-ILP are largely incom-
mensurable theories, then in the very moment of acceptance we must
acknowledge that neo-ILP is making a validity claim upon the premises
of another theory – here, NAIL. In order to make statements and judg-
ments on incommensurability, neo-ILP must assume and determine a set
of characteristics for NAIL. I argue that these assumptions and determi-
nations are not reasonable reductions, but fall under the rubric of what is
often considered false essentialism. ‘[F]alse essentialism violently distorts
the sheer complexity of overlapping traditions.’52 It is a form of reduc-
tionism that disables communication between, and the comparability of,
theories: one is disabled from fully discerning the points of overlap, con-
ﬂict or incommensurability. False essentialism is perpetrated when NAIL
theories are equated with deconstruction and post-modernism, when
the early works of Kennedy and Koskenniemi are presumed to speak on
behalf of the NAIL project. When considering NAIL why only consider
Koskenniemi and Kennedy in early-NAIL and not Allott and Carty, who
wrote equally inﬂuential work in the 1980s? Why only take up the NAIL
critique of the 1980s and not of the late 1990s and 2000s: why not con-
sider the work of China Mie´ville, Susan Marks, Anne Orford and the
later work of Martti Koskenniemi? Why only consider the relationship of
NAIL to deconstruction and not neo-Marxist theory, ideology critique,
Critical Theory, Foucauldian genealogy or Polanyi’s political economic
thought?53 The intellectual breadth and historical evolution of NAIL is
all but nulliﬁed.
51 Singh, ‘Discipline’, n. 13 at 240–243; Singh, n. 9 (critiquing how incommensurability is
so used in d’Aspremont n. 20; d’Aspremont, n. 50).
52 Bernstein, n. 10 at 66.
53 The historical complexity of NAIL is explored in Akbar Rasulov, ‘New Approach to
International Law: Images of a Genealogy’ in Jose´ Marı´a Beneyto, David Kennedy
(eds), New Approaches to International Law: The European and American Experiences
(T. M. C. Asser Press 2012) 151–192. See also generally Umut O¨zsu, ‘The Question of
Form:MethodologicalNotes onDialectics and International Law’ 23LJIL (2010) 687–707.
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False essentialism ensures that the various and complex points of inter-
action between neo-ILP and NAIL are not explored. Points of direct
conﬂict are not seen, let alone addressed. Allott’s evisceration of Hart
would surely have some relevance for Jean d’Aspremont’s reconstruction
of the latter.Mie´ville’s invocation of Pashukanis surely brings back images
of the interaction between the latter and Kelsen. This conﬂict over the-
orising the legal form would surely go to the heart of Jo¨rg Kammerhofer’s
project. Unger, Koskenniemi and Marks’ reliance on ideology that per-
petuates a false consciousness would surely have something to say about
the ideological dominance of neo-ILP. NAIL has certainly not spared the
social thesis or the formalised structure of Kelsen. Each of these threat-
ens the foundations of the neo-ILP project, but they are cast aside. False
essentialism insulates neo-ILP from those ideas that directly threaten it.
Discourse, conﬂict and disagreement are all avoided as incommensura-
bility is superﬁcially and strategically deployed.
2.2.2 Insulation technique 2: specialisation and the
post-modern form
The post-modern sensibility can be loosely deﬁned by fragmentation,
plurality and a ‘resistance to all forms of abstract totality, universalism
and rationalism’.54 Incommensurability is itself a concept that emerges
within this paradigm of thought. The concern to balance plurality/unity,
commonality/difference, and the self/other is one that has emerged with
vigour inourpost-modernworld. Intellectual andmaterial fragmentation
has been enabled by and is being perpetuated by specialisation. In the
world of ideas, specialisation has become the norm, but it has also become
representative of a distinctly post-modern form.Neo-ILPhas adopted this
particular aspect of the post-modern form: it has narrowed its claims and
seeks to be ‘modest’.55 But the appropriation of the post-modern form
is only a veneer under which the theory, yet again, insulates itself from
critique.
The foundational tenet of neo-ILP is in fact one of a narrow formal-
ism. The validity of a norm, its legal existence, is determined solely by
its pedigree: its conformity with a system’s sources.56 Neo-ILP is only
54 Bernstein, n. 10 at 57 (emphasis in original); see also Harvey, n. 10 at 9, 46–48; Terry
Eagleton, ‘Awakening from Modernity’ Times Literary Supplement, 20 February 1987,
194.
55 D’Aspremont, n. 50 at 370.
56 Kammerhofer and d’Aspremont, n. 14 at 8; d’Aspremont, n. 50 at 368–369; Jo¨rg Kam-
merhofer, ‘The Pure Theory of Law and Its “Modern” Positivism: International Legal Uses
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concerned with the cognition, identiﬁcation and existence of legal rules.
This claim to particularity allows for and necessitates other theories that
can ‘explain the whole phenomenon of law’.57 This specialised claim is
complemented by an effort to wrestle with unity and coexistence with
other theories in the pluralised world of international legal theory. Neo-
ILP has ‘doctrinal conciliatory virtues . . . it helps reconcile some of the
allegedly antonymic trends in international legal scholarship’.58 Neo-ILP’s
formalism can ‘underpin the continuously mutually enriching charac-
ter of . . . multiple strands of contemporary legal scholarship’, because it
is ‘non-exclusive, non-confrontational and conciliatory’.59 Neo-ILP pro-
motes ‘ecumenism’60 or unitywithin international legal scholarship.Neo-
ILP’s specialised claims underpin the potential for unity in legal scholar-
ship.
To embrace specialisation is to take up post-modernism (and mod-
ernism) on its invitation to consider the world as irredeemably complex
and as a consequence narrow any claimed conceptual ground. Adopting
this post-modern form allows neo-ILP to achieve two things. First, it
further insulates the theory from critical charges. Specialisation allows
neo-ILP to carve up scholarly enquiry into a number of component parts
each governed by different theories.Neo-ILP can govern the identiﬁcation
of rules; international legal realists, constructivists andNAIL can examine
the international legal discipline as a social andmaterial construct, as well
as critiquing the applicationof legal rules; and so on.61 This allows theoret-
ical enquiry to be neatly pigeonholed. This process allows neo-ILP to cast
aside competing theories as pertaining to different aspects of jurispruden-
tial enquiry, even if these theories have plenty to say about how claims to
the existence of rules are constructed, not to mention the pitfalls of neo-
ILP’s normative reconstruction of sources theory. Specialisation enables
insulation.
for Scholarship’ 106 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (2012) 365–
367 at 366; Jason Beckett, ‘Behind Relative Normativity: Rules and Process as Prerequisites
of Law’ 12 EJIL (2001) 627–650 at 627.
57 D’Aspremont, n. 50 at 370. 58 D’Aspremont, n. 20 at 217, 218.
59 D’Aspremont, n. 20 at 218, 219. 60 D’Aspremont, n. 50 at 370.
61 This is also present within the neo-ILP project itself. Note the tension between Kammer-
hofer’s Kelsenian project and d’Aspremont’s Hartian project. ‘Sure, Kelsen says, we can
conduct sociological studies into whether the law is generally obeyed or not; this is a very
valuable ﬁeld of study. But sociologists or other empirical studies can only capture the
periphery, not the norms themselves.’ Kammerhofer, n. 56 at 366.
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Second, specialisation allows neo-ILP to import a discourse of con-
ciliation and harmony amongst plurality. But this is no more than a
hegemonic manoeuvre garbed in conciliatory clothing. The discourse of
conciliation and happy coexistence presumes the presence of incommen-
surability and elevates the image of a reasonable theorist: one that is aware
of competing arguments and theoretical claims, but is capable of weaving
himself between them. But a theory that lays claim to reality cannot be
carved in terms of specialisations: its substantive claimsmay not be neatly
categorised. The claims of totality cannot be so easily set aside. Matters
are not so neat. Theory cannot be non-confrontational. It especially can-
not be so when laying claim to international law’s form. The sources of
international law are the gateway to legality. Normative claims as to how
formal they should be, or are, are not innocent and non-confrontational.
When one considers that neo-ILP’s specialisation (laying exclusive claim
to being able to identify legal rules) alongside its importation of a series of
normative projects, it is difﬁcult to not conceive of neo-ILP’s formalism
as seeking a theoretical monopoly on international law’s key: its sources.
The ‘responsibility assigned to [neo-ILP] remains, in my view, of primary
importance’.62 Conciliation and specialisation hides a certain exercise of
power.
2.2.3 Privileging technique 1: post-modernism appropriated
in the rationalist form
There is an incontestable incommensurability that implicitly structures
the editors’ project. In neo-ILP, we ﬁnd the reconstruction of rationalist
and partly modernist theories (Hartian and Kelsenian variants) that seeks
to exist in a post-modern world.63 ‘[P]ost-modern international legal
62 D’Aspremont, n. 50 at 370.
63 Kammerhofer and d’Aspremont, n. 14 at 1, 2, 7. For clariﬁcation, the argument here is
not that Hart’s or Kelsen’s theories are in every way modernist and rationalist. Nor is this
stated as regards d’Aspremont’s reconstruction of Hart and Kammerhofer’s of Kelsen.
My argument is that both traditions are somewhat intellectually rooted in modernist
and rationalist predispositions. These traditions are not controlling or total in their
effect, but important enough to have a lasting effect on how the theories are deployed
or function. They are modernist in their anti-foundationalism and rationalistic in their
ﬁdelity to the Enlightenment project. The incommensurability between rationalism and
modernism (and between Hart and Kelsen) is set aside here, despite its importance.
On the incommensurability between rationalism, modernity and post-modernity, see
Pierre Schlag, ‘Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law’ 67 Texas Law Review (1989)
1195–1250.
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positivism’64 seeks intellectual progress: to transcend its historical lineage
in one paradigm and to subsist in another. And of course in rational-
ism/modernism and post-modernity, we ﬁnd largely incommensurable
intellectual and cognitive frameworks.65 This incommensurability is just
as true for those intellectual projects that embrace the Enlightenment
project, such as neo-ILP, and those that reject its call to subservience
to rationality, such as a variety of post-modern thinkers. How can ideas
that draw upon and retain a limited ﬁdelity to modernist and rational-
ist traditions fully sustain themselves in the incommensurable paradigm
of post-modernity? Ideational progress and incommensurability sit in
uncomfortable tension.
But neo-ILP’s narrative prioritises its own lineage through the rational-
ist ideal of progress above the consideration of incommensurability. We
do not need to shift frameworks – from modernism to post-modernism –
and to abandon the rationalist/modernist elements of neo-ILP in order to
exist in a post-modern world. In elevating this narrative, the extent of the
incommensurability between post-modernism andmodernist/rationalist
frameworks is subsumed and relegated. Old ideas can exist in the new
world, they just need to adjust or tinker their substantive claims and shed
old skins. This incommensurability that structures this project is hidden
from view and the narrative of coherent ideational evolution is implic-
itly elevated.66 Neo-ILP as a theory seeks to function in a post-modern
world, but sustain and promote an incommensurable rationalist form
(aesthetic).67
64 Kammerhofer and d’Aspremont, n. 14 at 2.
65 There is perhaps one notable dissenter to this largely shared opinion: Jean-Franc¸ois
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Geoff Bennington, Brian
Massumi (trs), Manchester University Press 1984) 79 (‘A work can become modern only
if it is ﬁrst post-modern. Post-modernism thus understood is not modernism at its end
but in the nascent state.’) The majority of scholars, including Eagleton, Harvey, Jameson,
Foucault, Habermas, etc. advance the contrary position – as advocated here.
66 The argument in this paragraph is also premised on the editors’ own construction of
what is post-modern (alongside Section 2.2.1). The post-modern seems to be equated
to whatever work NAIL or CLS has produced in legal theory (this is a position taken
by others; see Anne Peters, ‘Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour’ 24 EJIL (2013)
533–552 at 548).More speciﬁcally it is equated to the works of Koskenniemi and Kennedy.
On their narrative of post-modernism, there should be a greater understanding of incom-
mensurability. But as Section 2.1 highlights, their understanding of Koskenniemi and
Kennedy is incorrect. I posit later that both neo-ILP and early NAIL work is premised in
the modernist tradition: the level of incommensurability between neo-ILP and NAIL is
not as great as one would think. And certainly to overcome NAIL is not to make neo-ILP
post-modern.
67 Schlag, n. 63 at 1212–1213 (discussing the aesthetics of rationalism).
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2.3 Theory as theory: co-opted ideas
So far we have seen how neo-ILP employs speciﬁc rhetorical subtleties
to defend, sustain and promote its positions. These have predominantly
focused on the speciﬁcities of neo-ILP andNAIL: an exacting examination
of the politics of deﬁnition and incommensurability that structure the
relationship between the two theories. This section will take a step back:
towards (and away from) epistemology and tradition. It argues that the
reduction of theory to a set of ideas, concepts and relationships, to the
ideational, is corrosive. To abstract knowledge from its materialistic basis,
privileges certain theories and simultaneously sustains existing power
inequalities (and claims to such).
Traditional (legal) theory is not about challenging the process, form
and practice of our own thought. In such theory, the privileged reader is
one who is fully informed and can make an autonomous choice between
positions. The preservation of theory-independent (and therefore self-
validating), rational and autonomous choice is key. Neo-ILP imports this
liberal, plural rationalism.68 Early-NAIL is arguably just as guilty.69 It
regards the choice of scholarly approach to be arbitrary and introduces
a pluralist value-relativism regarding legal methodology.70 According to
this narrative, theories are a collection of ideas and one can make a
choice between them in anon-political andneutral framework.71 Neo-ILP
reduces all legal theory down to a question of substance – what to think.
But certain theories, like NAIL, question how we think. Such theories are
subsumed by neo-ILP’s rationalism as merely another substantive way to
think, another theory: we can internalise this theory that questions how
we think, if we so choose. Questioning how we think becomes merely
another way to think about things: another idea, another theory that can
be adopted. Rationalism is privileged as any challenge of form is reduced
to another substantive idea. Rather than taking subject-decentring theory
seriously on its own terms – as questioning the practice of theory – the
impeding theory is co-opted. The point I wish to make is that neo-ILP
68 Singh, ‘Discipline’, n. 13 at 246–247.
69 See ns 36–40 and accompanying text. Also see Allott, who was so inﬂuential in early-
NAIL: Philip Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (2nd edn Oxford University
Press 2001) 6–7, 39–52.
70 Kammerhofer and d’Aspremont, n. 14 at 8.
71 For a critique, see Koskenniemi, ‘Letter’, n. 23 at 352–353.
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subsumes the NAIL challenge by distorting and degrading its nature. Let
me explain.72
As we have seen, early-NAIL (as narrowly deﬁned in this project)
was intellectually rooted in the Frankfurt School and structuralism
(Section 2.1). Both are schools of thought ﬁrmly embedded in total-
ising traditions.73 This intellectual heritage is one of modernism, not
post-modernism.74 But even then, to be more speciﬁc, there is far more
Habermas in Koskenniemi’s writing than there is Adorno (and far more
Horkheimer) – let alone Lyotard. Koskenniemi’s project is both a part
of modernity and a critique of it.75 It aims to highlight the underside of
reason, not abandon it.
Applied in international law, the critical programme takes under scrutiny
existing consciousness about international law and reality as this is
expressed in conventional legal concepts and categories . . . Therefore, it
tries to penetrate the naturalness of givenness (objectivity) of those con-
cepts and reveal their context-bound character. Once conventional con-
sciousness will thus appear as contingent and contestable, the actual will
manifest itself in a new light . . . It seeks to undo the naturalness of con-
ventional ways of thinking about law and proceeds to show that the way
we conceptualise it binds us to certain, more fundamental commitments –
commitments which may or may not be ones that we like to make.76
Themodernist seeks to highlight and situate the limits of reason. She nor-
mally does so through some totalising, structuring construct. In the case
of Koskenniemi, it is the discursive structure of international law. This is
the crucial difference between the post-modern and the modern.77 The
latter does not seek to completely abandon the Enlightenment project
72 A large part of what follows is inﬂuenced by the work of Pierre Schlag. See references in
n. 34; Pierre Schlag, ‘Normativity and the Politics of Form’ 139 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review (1991) 801–932; Pierre Schlag, ‘Normative and Nowhere to Go’ 43 Stanford
Law Review (1990) 167–191.
73 Kennedy, n. 23 at 271–276; Derrida, n. 25; Foucault, n. 40.
74 See n. 54; Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act
(Cornell University Press 1981) 55.
75 For a somewhat similar self-understanding, see Koskenniemi, n. 42 at 31–32. In many
ways, Koskenniemi’s ﬁdelity to his descriptive or cognitive project requires that he so
situate himself. This is the inﬂuence of the Critical Theory.
76 Koskenniemi, FATU, n. 23 at 540–541.
77 Ju¨rgen Habermas, ‘The Normative Content of Modernity’ in Ju¨rgen Habermas, The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Frederick Lawrence (tr.), MIT Press
1987) 336–367 at 337–338; Frederic Jameson, ‘ThePolitics ofTheory: Ideological Positions
in the Postmodernism Debate’ 33 New German Critique (1984) 53–65 at 57–59.
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and the rationality it imports. If anything, the modernist seeks to deepen
the Enlightenment project.78 Contrary to the narrative asserted by this
project, early-NAIL, and in particular Koskenniemi, is neither decon-
structionist nor post-modernist. Rather, it belongs within the best critical
traditions ofmodernism.What emerges is a scathing critique of liberalism
without the abandoning of its ideals. Again, this is just so much Haber-
mas, with perhaps a splash of Horkheimer. Early-NAIL does not abandon
the Enlightenment project, but takes it to its logical, contradictory and
conﬂicting conclusions.79 It forces us ‘into seeing that commitment in a
new light’.80
Butmodernism, andparticularly this variant, challengeshowone thinks
about theory. Theory is both cognitive and emancipatory.81 It can only
be so if it is self-reﬂexive. For this, it must be both part of the world
and a point of critique for it. An individual does theory as a historical
subject.82 Her relationship to the social is a matter of social production
with a particular history. Any theory must apply this insight to itself:
it must acknowledge that its cognitive vision of the world is subject to
its own critique. Theory is both situated within and constitutive of the
social. Theory is, then, among other things, about itself. In contrast,
empiricist or rational theories, such as neo-ILP, are not self-reﬂexive and
seem to presume the cognitive conclusions they posit.83 For the critical
theorist, theoryno longer functionspurelyon theplaneof epistemologyor
hermeneutics. ‘Reason is simultaneously subject to the interest in reason.
Reason, it can be said, pursues an emancipatory cognitive interest which
aspires to the act of reﬂection as such.’84
78 See David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger and After (University of
Chicago Press 1986) 1–19.
79 The attentive reader will note that the insulating incommensurability asserted by neo-ILP,
between itself and NAIL, is now not so stark (see Section 2.2). That incommensurability
is starting to crumble and along with it the insulation in which neo-ILP has clothed itself.
80 Koskenniemi, FATU, n. 23 at 556.
81 Koskenniemi, FATU, n. 23 at 537–538; Jameson, n. 74 at 281–299.
82 Horkheimer, n. 37 at 200.
83 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideologies of Advanced Industrial
Society (2nd edn Beacon Press 1991) 115–116. See Singh, ‘Discipline’, n. 13 at 249–
260 (demonstrating how this takes place regarding neo-Hartian theories such as Jean
d’Aspremont’s).
84 Ju¨rgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Jeremy J. Shapiro (tr.), Beacon Press
1971) 197–198.
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This is apparent in early-NAIL writing,85 but the challenge it repre-
sents is subsumed and co-opted by a single stroke. The critical position is
reduced to just another idea, another theory. It is cast as another ideational
position that can be adopted upon one’s whimsy.86 It presumes and sus-
tains the image of the liberal autonomous individual who believes the
privilege of his choice; to decide with complete autonomous rational-
ity which idea may be used, which idea is useful and which is not.87
This is the snare of liberal methodological pluralism. It privileges rea-
son without recognising how it is thoroughly abused, and it assumes
and sustains the very mechanism which enables this: ‘the autonomous,
coherent, integrated, rational, originary self’.88 So when neo-ILP consid-
ers its relationship with NAIL, it assumes the very form or approach to
theory that co-opts and subsumes the challenge of NAIL. It becomes a
relationship determined by rational value-relativism, autonomy and the
ideational.
This ideational co-option of NAIL has prevented the complete ﬂower-
ing of said thought. There is, then, some intuitive merit in considering
neo-ILP as a counter-revolutionary theory.89
A counter-revolutionary theory is one which is deliberately proposed to
deal with a proposed revolutionary theory [here, NAIL] in such a manner
85 It is also found in a less totalising form in late-NAIL writings (post 2000). Notably,
see Susan Marks, ‘International Judicial Activism and the Commodity-Form Theory of
International Law’ 18 EJIL (2007) 199–211 at 208–209. This post-modernist approach to
ideology critique can be contrasted with the modernist impulse we see in neo-Marxist
strands of late-NAIL scholarship: China Mie´ville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory
of International Law (Brill 2005).
86 ‘[I]t is to treat all these outlooks as if they were on the same footing, in the same philo-
sophical competition – each waiting for you and me to buy its philosophical furniture
for an already-created world.’ Schlag, n. 63 at 1204–1205. See also Schlag, ‘Normativity’,
n. 72 at 892–896.
87 Schlag, n. 63 at 1213–1217. Schlag also demonstrates how this takes place where one
recognises one’s choices are socially and rhetorically constructed.His notionof the ‘relative
autonomous self’ concedes both autonomy and construction, but he demonstrates that
autonomy always trumps. See Schlag, ‘Normativity’, n. 72 at 895; Pierre Schlag, ‘Fish v.
Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self’ 76 Georgetown Law Journal (1987–
1988) 37–58.
88 Schlag, ‘Normativity’, n. 72 at 175 (but talking about post-modernism, not high mod-
ernism: although the insight applies equally).
89 I draw upon the following insight of David Harvey: ‘it seems intuitively plausible to think
of the movement of ideas in the social sciences as a movement based on revolution and
counter-revolution in contrast to the natural sciences to which such a notion does not
appear to be so immediately applicable.’ Harvey, n. 6 at 113.
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that the threatened social changes which general acceptance of the revo-
lutionary theory would generate are, either by cooptation or subversion,
prevented from being realized.90
But ideational co-optation still hides another level of privilege: arguably
the driving level at which privilege is sustained. These are, of course,
the material bases of neo-ILP and NAIL as well as the traditions they
belong to. At the level of the academy, the institutional bases of NAIL are
extremely limited (Harvard, LSE, SOAS, Helsinki, Toronto being the only
sustained examples).91 In contrast, to think of international law in terms
of its social practice (judgments, ILC Reports, etc.), or even as a set of self-
governing rules, is dominant in the university. These approaches govern
education through supposing, and constantly buttressing the idea, that
they alone speak about law. But neo-ILP will always assume a material
and ideational dominance because the driving force behind paradigm
formation in international law is its practice. Neo-ILP buttresses practice
in a manner that NAIL cannot.
It may be essential to examine how the relationship between theories
is cast. The rhetorical and discursive frameworks that are used to inﬂu-
ence and manipulate the way in which we think about international law
is key to accessing the discipline’s operation. And it may be important
to look at the politics of form between theories, to make transparent
modes of manipulation. But it is perhaps more important to situate these
forms, these politics, these theories in their material contexts. Ideas do
not emerge, dominate or subjugate in a vacuum. This is a task which
approaching theory as ‘theory’ sidelines. But only if one adopts a ratio-
nalist approach to theory. And one must resist being seduced by this
dominantly solipsistic way of thinking.
3 Conclusion
This chapter is about the politics of theory. It has sought to brieﬂy examine
the structure and form of NAIL and neo-ILP, as well as their intellectual
heritages. It has demonstrated how the form and structure of a theory
is central to protecting and privileging it. Form will always be violent;
it will always make a claim to an object outside of its own content.
But to recognise how it constrains, structures and enables our choices is
essential. This is all the more important when one considers international
90 Harvey, n. 6 at 114. 91 See Rasulov, n. 53.
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legal theory to be a competition between ideas that make demands on
how we see the socio-legal world. Perspective is everything. And theory
precedes perspective: ‘society’s theories are the atmosphere it breathes’.92
My task here has to been to highlight how form is complicit in struc-
turing the way in which we think about both theory and the world. Con-
fronting formallowsus to confront thepolitics of theory and challengeour
existing consciousness. To examine how, on an ideational level, theories
reify certain visions of the world. Uncovering the creative and aesthetic
aspects of our intellectual endeavours is but oneway to take formseriously.
With no sense of irony, neo-ILP seeks to transcend incommensurable
frameworks of enquiry (modernism/rationalism and post-modernism)
by utilising post-modern concepts and tactics (incommensurability, spe-
cialisation). To unmask these steps and contradictions is the modest step
I have taken in this chapter.
92 Allott, n. 69 at 31.
